Sep 052008
 

The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad (WP)

Michael Taarnby
WP 20/2008 – 9/5/2008

Introduction
The current volume of publications dealing with Islamist militancy and terrorism defies belief in terms of its contents. This can be perceived as part of a frantic effort to catch up for the lack of attention devoted to this phenomenon during the 1980s and 1990s, when this field of research field was considerably underdeveloped. The present level of research activity is struggling to keep pace with developments. Thus, it is primarily preoccupied with attempting to describe what is actually happening in the world right now and possibly to explain future developments. This is certainly a worthwhile effort, but the topic of this paper is a modest attempt to direct more attention and interest towards the much overlooked sub-field of historical research within Jihadi studies.

The global Jihad has a long history, and everyone interested in this topic will be quite familiar with the significance of Afghanistan in fomenting ideological support for it and for bringing disparate militant groups together through its infamous training camps during the 1990s. However, many more events have been neglected by the research community to the point where most scholars and analysts are left with an incomplete picture, that is most often based on the successes of the Jihadi groups. Yet there are plenty of examples of failures which have rarely been placed in the larger context and a thorough understanding of these events would undoubtedly provide a much more nuanced picture of the Jihad. Examples such as al-Qaeda’s failure to establish itself in the Horn of Africa and its exodus from Sudan, the lack of local support for the foreign Mujahedin in Bosnia or the more general failure to unite disparate Jihadi groups all provide stimulus for further inquiry. The framework of this particular sub-field would require systematic studies on overlooked and underexploited historical events within Jihadi studies, and this would obviously include obscure militant groups and events.

Somewhat ironically, the only known effort to compile historical case studies with the aim of learning from past mistakes has been undertaking by the Jihadis themselves. The seminal work of Abu Musab al-Suri in his The Global Islamic Resistance Call is little known outside Jihadi ideological circles, yet al-Suri spent several years during a self-imposed sabbatical from the Jihad to devise a new concept of Jihadi warfare. Considering the thought put into this massive 1600-page treaty one has no option but to conclude that he succeeded. Few Western scholars have approached this important book with the respect it deserves, the exception being Brynjar Lia in his equally seminal Architect of Global Jihad.[1]

The sub-field of historical Jihadi studies is wide open to anyone seriously interested in acquiring a deeper understanding of the development of the Jihad. There are plenty of failed militant Islamist groups, lost battles, strategic blunders and vicious ideological strife to examine. They all represent a minuscule part of a large mosaic that, when properly pieced together and understood, will eventually present a much more comprehensive picture of the development of the global Jihad over the past three decades. This is indeed an interesting historical journey and one that presents a number of surprises even for the initiated. The following case study on the Mujahedin who fought in Nagorno-Karabakh is exactly one such very small piece, yet for all its obscurity it sheds light on several subsequent events linked to the Jihad.

See the Full Paper: Elcano Royal Institute – PDF Version or HTML Version

Mar 142008
 

Ms. Štiglic (Slovenia): The European Union recognizes the right of Member States to bring issues to the attention of the General Assembly for consideration, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the rules and procedures of the General Assembly.

However, the European Union believes that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group should retain the lead in settling the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. The EU fully supports the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group towards a peaceful, just and lasting settlement. The EU reiterates its support for all the principles, without exception, established within the Minsk Group and values the views of the Group’s Co-Chairs.

The settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh issue is an important element of the European Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union and features prominently in the related action plans. In that context, we remain ready to support all steps which contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The European Union calls on the parties concerned to avoid any actions that could lead to heightened tensions and undermine the ongoing mediation efforts.

 

Mr. Wolff (United States of America): The political-level representatives of France, the Russian Federation and the United States, as Co-Chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group dealing with the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, jointly proposed a set of basic
principles for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict to the sides in November 2007 on the margins of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid. Those basic principles are founded on the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including those related to refraining from the threat or use of force, the territorial integrity of States and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The proposal transmitted to the sides in Madrid comprises a balanced package of principles that are currently under negotiation. The sides have agreed that no single element is agreed until all elements are agreed by the parties.

Unfortunately, the draft resolution before us today selectively propagates only certain of those principles, to the exclusion of others, without considering the Co-Chairs’ proposal in its balanced entirety. Because of this selective approach, the three OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries must oppose this unilateral draft resolution. They reiterate that a peaceful, equitable and lasting settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict will require unavoidable compromises among the parties that reflect the principles of territorial integrity, non-use of force and equal rights of peoples, as well as other principles of international law.

While the three Minsk Group Co-Chair countries will vote against this unilateral draft resolution, which threatens to undermine the peace process, they reaffirm their support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and thus do not recognize the independence of Nagorny Karabakh. At a time when serious clashes with loss of life have occurred along the line of contact, both sides must refrain from unilateral and maximalist actions either at the negotiating table or in the field.

 

Mr. Ripert (France) (spoke in French): As just stated by the representative of the United States of America on behalf of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, France, along with the other two Co-Chairs, will vote against the draft resolution that has been unilaterally presented by Azerbaijan. Our country would reaffirm at the same time our full support for the Common Position of the European Union on the question of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, as presented by Slovenia.

 

Voting results: 39 in favour to 7 against, 100 abstentions:

In favour: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Colombia, Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Georgia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
Against: Angola, Armenia, France, India, Russian Federation, United States, Vanuatu.

Abstain: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia.

Absent: Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Syria, Tajikistan, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.


Source: UN Official Records – A/62/PV.86

File: UN Official Records – A/62/PV.86

Mar 142008
 

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/62/L.42)]

62/243. The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

The General Assembly,
Guided by the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 853 (1993) of 29 July 1993, 874 (1993) of 14 October 1993 and 884 (1993) of 12 November 1993, as well as General Assembly resolutions 48/114 of 20 December 1993, entitled “Emergency international assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan”, and 60/285 of 7 September 2006, entitled “The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan”,

Recalling also the report of the fact-finding mission of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and the letter on the fact-finding mission from the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group addressed to the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Taking note of the report of the environmental assessment mission led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to the fire-affected territories in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region,

Reaffirming the commitments of the parties to the conflict to abide scrupulously by the rules of international humanitarian law,

Seriously concerned that the armed conflict in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan continues to endanger international peace and security, and mindful of its adverse implications for the humanitarian situation and development of the countries of the South Caucasus,

  1. Reaffirms continued respect and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its  internationally recognized borders;
  2. Demands the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan;
  3. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the population expelled from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan to return to their homes, and stresses the necessity of creating appropriate conditions for this return, including the comprehensive rehabilitation of the conflict-affected territories;
  4. Recognizes the necessity of providing normal, secure and equal conditions of life for Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which will allow an effective democratic system of self-governance to be built up in this region within the Republic of Azerbaijan;
  5. Reaffirms that no State shall recognize as lawful the situation resulting from the occupation of the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining this situation;
  6. Expresses its support to the international mediation efforts, in particular those of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, aimed at peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, and recognizes the necessity of intensifying these efforts with a view to achieving a lasting and durable peace in compliance with the provisions stipulated above;
  7. Calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations and arrangements to effectively contribute, within their competence, to the process of settlement of the conflict;
  8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session a comprehensive report on the implementation of the present resolution;
  9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled “The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan”.

86th plenary meeting
14 March 2008


Source: UN General Assembly, 62th Session

Voting Results: 39 in favour to 7 against,  100 abstentions.

Nov 302007
 

We note with satisfaction that Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to continue the
ongoing negotiations on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during the forthcoming election year.
We support the mediation efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, and their development with the parties of a set of basic principles for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. We are strongly encouraging both sides to overcome the last remaining differences and thereby to endorse the overall concept of the settlement and to proceed on this basis with drafting a comprehensive Peace Agreement.


Source: OSCE Madrid Ministerial Council [MC(15) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8; MC.DOC/2/07 of 30 November 2007]
File: Ministerial Statement (MC.DOC/2/07)

Nov 292007
 

MADRID, 29 November 2007 – The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs issued the following statement today:

“Prior to the opening of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid on November 29, 2007, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner met with the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Vardan Oskanian and Elmar Mammadyarov, to demonstrate political-level support for the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries’ effort to forge a just and lasting settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

“In the meeting, the representatives of the United States, France and Russia formally presented a set of Basic Principles for the Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict to the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers for transmission to the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“It was noted that over the last three years of talks the two sides had significantly narrowed their differences through the mediation of the Co-Chair countries and that only a few differences remained to be settled. As noted by the representatives of the three Co-Chair countries, the joint proposal that was transmitted today to the parties offered just and constructive solutions to these last remaining differences.

“The parties to the conflict were strongly urged to bring to a close the current stage of negotiations by endorsing the proposed Basic Principles and commencing as soon as possible to draft a comprehensive Peace Agreement.”


Source: OSCE Website

Dec 102006
 

We, the people of Artsakh:

  • filled with the spirit of freedom;
  • realizing the dream of our ancestors and the natural right of people to lead a free and secure life in the Homeland and to create;
  • showing a firm will to develop and defend the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh formed on September 2, 1991 on the basis of the right of self-determination and proclaimed independent by a referendum conducted on December 10, 1991;as a free, sovereign state of citizens with equal rights, where a human being, his life and security, rights and freedoms are of supreme value,
  • affirming faithfulness to the principles of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic adopted on January 06, 1992;
  • recalling with gratitude the heroic struggle of our ancestors and present generations for the restoration of freedom, bowing to the memory of the perished in a war forced upon us;
  • fulfilled with the power of unity of all Armenians of the world;
  • reviving the historic traditions of statehood in Artsakh; Continue reading »
Mar 252005
 

«Azg» (Yerevan), 2005, March 25

PEACE TO KARABAKH

(to the structure of settlement)

Ву Vladimir Kazimirov

Instead of introduction

Dear visitor of this site,

Under this heading I placed my memoirs basically on the period when I was obliged to head Russia’s intermediary mission on Karabakh settlement, be representative of the President of Russian Federation on Nagorno Karabakh issue and also participant and co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk group from Russia (1992-96).

I would like to spur a serious study of history of peaceful and political settlement of Karabakh conflict. I shall be glad for critical remarks, corrections, even for refutations on separate episodes. I am ready to survey them, first of all, not from positions of author’s insulted vanity but from natural desire to attach more reliability to the description of events of recent past, which, unfortunately, already suffers both involuntary confusion and deliberate distortions. Moreover, I am ready to make corrections to my text or include alternative versions in view of remarks. I have turned to Azerbaijani and Armenian colleagues either involved in this process or closely watching it with an offer to draw the objective picture of Karabakh settlement history in this site.

I’ll post the sketches in the site bit by bit as they are ready. I shall begin with a number of important, at least as I see them, though inconsequent episodes: my appointment to “fire brigade” on Karabakh, first restrictions of military actions, Bishkek, ceasefire since May 12, 1994. I shall try to gradually fill in the gaps that divide them. In view of some disputes on separate events or episodes, I will probably have to attach documents of this process as appendices to these memoirs.

And now let me start looking forward to your arguments or criticism. Alexander Tvardovsky put it right indicating the truth: “Let it be thicker no matter how bitter it is”. Continue reading »

Dec 012004
 

«Highlights», ХII.2004
Vladimir KAZIMIROV

KARABAKH AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

The resolutions of UN Security Council are among the decisive documents in the modern international life. All the UN member-countries, of course, focus their attention on the complete and well-timed (and not postponed or selective) fulfillment of those documents. There are 4 resolutions on Karabakh conflict (822, 853, 874 and 884). All of them were adopted in the heat of Karabakh war, from April 30 to November 12, 1993.

In the recent years, the fulfillment of resolutions has been more frequently demanded by Baku but only concerning the part of immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupation forces from 7 regions of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenian-Karabakh troops and return of their refugees to those territories. Now Nagorno Karabakh itself is also more and more persistently enclosed by those demands; Heydar Aliyev was more moderate in this issue (too much formal logic hardly ever applicable in conflict situations is necessary in order to refer Nagorno Karabakh to occupied lands).

To put it differently, Azerbaijan, in essence, reduces the requirements of resolutions to the liberation of occupied territories. This country wants to draw attention to this grave consequence of an armed conflict, to the pain of the forced migrants. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan wants to push to the background, to delay the elimination of the major disputable problem and cause of the conflict, determination of Nagorno Karabakh’s status.

1. Adequate treatment of the UN Security Council resolutions is impossible without considering the hierarchy of their demands, without taking into account the fact that in the summer and in the fall of 1993 did the culmination of the war arrive. That’s why the priority and the most important demand was to cease fire, all the military and hostile activities. This demand passes through all the 4 resolutions as if it is their common pivot.
UN Security Council brought forward this demand as early as in the very first resolution N 822 adopted on April 30 1993, but a whole year and another 3 resolutions were not enough for its fulfillment.
It’s high time we specified which side violated this basic demand of all resolutions and bears special responsibility for the fact that its failure to solve this cardinal problem laid the foundation for the failure of almost all other demands, a complex non-fulfillment of the Security Council resolutions.
Of course, nobody is innocent here, but, no doubt, the “palm” belongs to the Azeri side. Even having lost the control over its territories Azerbaijan’s leaders both in the years of A. Elchibey and H. Aliyev were persistent in their attempts to achieve a sudden change on the front and solve the conflict by force as if they were unaware of their own responsibility for the occupation and its extension. In the years of Russia’s active mediation, a whole calendar of cases of cease-fire breaking by both sides, evasion from such agreements and other cases of underestimation of peace-making initiatives accumulated (resolution N 884 also speaks about this in Aesopian language). With all the four resolutions of UN Security Council, three times did Baku directly neglect (December 1993 and February 1994) the chances of putting an end to military operations.
Cease-fire was achieved with Russia’s assistance on May 12 1994 not so much on the basis of the UN Security Council resolutions, rather, on the basis of April 15 1994 statement of the Council of CIS country-heads, anyway, they had a common goal. This agreement was already different as compared with the previous ones, it wasn’t a temporary one or envisaged for several days only, but it was perpetual (by definition). i.e. actually permanent, and owing to the persistence of Moscow, it was not signed by two sides only as it was done before but by all the three sides of the conflict (not only Baku and Stepanakert, but also Yerevan).
2. …..
3. The demand on liberation of the occupied territories or immediate withdrawal of all the occupation forces also passes through all resolutions. Baku claims that all the resolutions demand unconditional withdrawal, but this only refers to July 29 resolution N 853. How did the word “unconditional” disappear from resolutions N874 and N884? Did it disappear by accident, because of absent-mindedness? What if it disappeared in consequence of regular non-fulfillment by one of the sides of the major requirement, i.e., to cease military operations. Who could have expected to withdraw the forces without ceasing the fights? And who didn’t want to cease them? The UN Security Council couldn’t have compensated for non-fulfillment of its resolutions. On this very background did the unconditional demand turn into a subject of negotiations between the sides. For many times this issue has been a subject of negotiations but it wasn’t solved because of the position of Armenians and because of the fact that Baku immediately insisted on the withdrawal from all the territories, even from Shushi and Lachin, without even showing any willingness to touch upon the Nagorno Karabakh status.
4. The UN Security Council resolutions contain a number of other demands and appeals that remained non-fulfilled:
a) “to restore economic, transport and energy communications in the region” (853); “to eliminate all the obstacles to communication and transport” (874). From the very start of the conflict, Azerbaijan made use of the total blockade of Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia meanwhile accusing Armenia of Nakhijevan’s blockade. To fulfill those demands he puts forward the liberation of the lands as a preliminary pre-condition.
Besides, Baku broke off its contacts in all the spheres with Armenia and the more so with Nagorno Karabakh;
b) a number of appeals were raised in the negotiation process. Since as early as on May 19 1992, Azerbaijan refused to participate in the Minsk conference unless the Armenians left Shusha and Lachin occupied by them and on April 6 1993 they left the consultations of the “Minsk Five” in Geneva, the UN Security Council resolutions proposed that “negotiations should be immediately resumed within the framework of the Minsk Group peace process” (822), persistently urged to refrain from any actions hampering the peaceful settlement of the conflict and to “continue the negotiations within the framework of the Minsk Group, as well as by means of direct contacts” (853), and to convene an urgent Minsk conference (874).
The negotiations within the framework of the Minsk Group continued in 1994, as for direct contacts with Nagorno Karabakh, Baku completely contracted them at the end of 1993 against resolutions N853, N874 and N884.
The resolutions call “the local Armenian forces” (822), “Armenians of the Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan” (853, 884) a side opposed to it. By saying direct contacts, the resolutions meant the ones between Baku and Stepanakert (also because the agreements on cease-fire reached with the assistance of Russia are mentioned there for many times and all these agreements were concluded with Stepanakert in 1993, but Yerevan was not a party).
One may sum up all this as follows:
AZERBAIJAN persistently wouldn’t fulfill the main demand of the UN Security Council resolutions, to cease the fire, military and hostile operations, which had a negative impact on the fulfillment of other demands. Azerbaijan doesn’t fulfill them at present, either as far as the following points are concerned: 1) restore the economic, transport and energy communications in the region, 2) use the direct contacts with Nagorno Karabakh, 3) convene a Minsk conference.
ARMENIA AND NAGORNO KARABAKH refuse to meet the demand of withdrawing the occupation forces from Azerbaijani regions beyond the boundaries of Nagorno Karabakh insisting on a package and all-embracing settlement.
ARMENIA didn’t completely meet the appeal to exert restraining influence on Nagorno Karabakh and at present by mistake substitutes for it in the negotiation process, which though differently but again distorts the real configuration of the conflict.

As a result, the truce that has lasted for more than 10 years now remains the main achievement. It’s impossible to consider the UN Security Council resolutions on Karabakh as fulfilled and the position of sides of the conflict as adequate to them. It’s significant that the UN Security Council didn’t adopt any other resolutions on this conflict as their non-fulfillment by the sides undermines its authority.
Of course, the resolutions adopted 11 years ago can hardly be considered free of mistakes and valid for all times. They were dictated by the realities of that time.
Now when for this or that purpose attempts to involve UN in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict are again made it’s important to sum up the activity of last 10 years. We shouldn’t shut our eyes to the past, we should learn our lesson from it.
We should demand from the leaders of all the sides, in all forms and from any tribune a rigid political will for settlement, serious efforts and energetic negotiations (instead of false gestures of maneuvering, information war and propaganda performances). So far, their efforts have proved to be obviously insufficient. They should coordinate the bases of a peaceful settlement, which would make it possible to adopt a new resolution of the UN Security Council in the future in order to support a historical reconciliation between Azeries and Armenians.
The international community should put a question before the sides, if they are able to recognize the Nagorno Karabakh status a disputable problem. It’s clear to the whole world but only not to the sides. No matter how hard it may seem, the authorities of all the sides still need to pass this test on practicability and capability of transition to a constructive search of settlement. If not, then what caused the conflict, why did we hold negotiations for so many years? If yes, then this would be the first step of deviation from the current ultimatum demands excluding any solution to the problem except the one in favor of them, the first step towards a more civilized solution to the dispute, elimination of vain but dangerous appeals to its forced solution as well as the grave consequences of the armed conflict.


Source: Vladimir Kazimirov’s personal website

Similar Russian article: Карабах и резолюции Совета Безопасности ООН

Jan 012004
 

“The Karabakh Problem: The Thorny Road to Freedom and Independence”

Second, revised edition, “Zangak-97” Press, 2004
By Nikolay Hovhannisyan

In this second, revised edition the attention is focused on the reasons of forcibly attachment of Karabakh to Azerbaijan, to a state, which did not exist in history as a state until 1918, and which was a violation of self-determination right of Karabakh Armenians. The author emphasized the importance of new approaches to the resolution of Karabakh conflict taking into account new political, military and legal realities. It also underlines the lawful right of this ancient Armenian native land for union with motherland Armenia or for state independence.
In a special chapter the author reviewed and evaluated several variants of the Karabakh conflict resolution, proposed by different international organizations, policy makers or scholars, including the last suggestions made in the framework of the OSCE Minsk group.

FILE: Nikolay Hovhannisyan “The Karabakh Problem: The Thorny Road to Freedom and Independence” 2004 Continue reading »

May 012003
 

“Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War”

New York University Press 2003
By Thomas de Waal

In his book “Black Garden” Thomas de Waal tries to recreate the events of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1988.  De Waal mainly base his book on interviews and archival documents.

Many evaluate this book as a balanced view of the conflict. However, the book “Black Garden” is also well criticized for creating an artificial balance at the expense of correct facts and findings. So, this book is an interesting one to read, however be careful when using it as a source and double-check all references. Continue reading »